Active Externalism

Introduction

In the paper, The Extended Mind, Andy Clark and David Chalmers present their extended mind thesis. They begin the paper by asking “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” For many, it may seem intuitive to believe that the mind is entirely contained within the brain, and everything outside of one’s brain is outside of their mind. Using this notion of internalism, the mind may be considered an emergent property of the brain but is ultimately contained within the brain, and cognitive processes can only occur in the brain. However, externalists believe that the external environment also plays a role in cognition. In Clark and Chalmers’ extended mind thesis, they argue for active externalism, the idea that objects outside of one’s brain can be a part of the mind.

Active externalism asserts that the environment plays an active role in cognitive processes. That is, parts of the external world can function as cognitive processes if they play a similar role to that which would be recognized as cognitive if it occurred in the brain. Cognition is not confined within the boundaries of the individual and their physical brain, but it can extend into the external environment, incorporating tools, devices, or anything else. In cognitive science, this work broadens the understanding of what a cognitive process actually is, extending its definition beyond the traditional boundaries of the brain and the body. This view recognizes the significant role of external factors and modern technologies in cognitive tasks – it explains that tools and technologies are not merely aiding cognition, but that they are integral parts of it.

Examples

Clark and Chalmers use the example of mental rotation, arguing that imagining rotating objects on a computer screen, using cognitive processes of the mind, is no different than simply rotating the objects using processes of the computer, like in a photo-editing application. In this way, the computer can be considered part of the mind, and the processes that allow rotation on the computer can be considered cognitive.

The first example that comes to mind for me is the use of the “Reminders” or “Calendar” app on a smartphone, but the following reasoning can also be applied to conventional to-do lists and calendars (and even language itself, but this is outside the scope of this paper). Traditionally, memory has been a cognitive process that happens internally within one’s brain. Without these apps (or analogous tools), one would have to rely exclusively on memory to keep track of dates, meetings, and important tasks. However, when someone enters a reminder into the app, they effectively offload a part of their memory onto an external device, allowing them to only require remembering to have their phone with them, reserving internal cognitive load for other things. When the time comes and the phone alerts the individual by triggering a notification, it works similarly to the memory recall process in the brain. In this way, the smartphone becomes an active participant in the cognitive processes of memory and recall, functioning as a part of the mind.

I would take this argument a step further to say that artificial intelligence (AI) tools also function as a part of the mind. Professors may argue that, by using AI tools (like ChatGPT) to write essays, students are simply being lazy and aren’t really doing the work. In reality, this argument is rooted in societal tradition and these tools function to achieve the same outcomes that writing an essay in the traditional sense does. While a student may be less likely to comprehend the information within their internal mind, if one uses the lens of active externalism, the AI tool is a part of the student’s mind. The AI tool simply allows the student to offload internal cognition to the computer, reserving internal cognitive processes for other tasks. (There is much more to say about this, but that is outside the scope of this paper.)

I would also argue that one’s mind not only extends beyond their own brain, but into the brains of others. For example, consider the role of the professor, and that of other students, in a learning environment. Here, cognition is a collaborative and social process. Using the lens of internalism, one would be forced to argue that the cognitive process of understanding is a process isolated within one’s physical brain. On the contrary, learning and understanding are often facilitated through interactions with others. When students engage in group discussions, projects, or study groups, they are essentially participating in distributed cognitive work. Each student brings their unique understanding, knowledge, and skills to the group. Through discussion and collaboration, these individual contributions are pooled together, leading to a richer and more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter than what any one student could achieve alone. For example, during a group discussion, one student may contribute key facts, another student may offer an insightful interpretation of these facts, and a third may draw connections to other relevant ideas. This collaborative process extends the cognitive capabilities of each individual, allowing them to achieve a level of understanding that transcends their individual capacities. Educators also play a crucial role in the cognitive processes of their students by facilitating learning. They provide support, guidance, and structure to the cognitive processes of students in order to help them learn more effectively. For example, an educator might break down a concept into more manageable parts, provide examples and analogies, ask guiding questions, or offer feedback that helps students refine their cognition. This enables students to engage with and understand concepts that might be beyond their immediate grasp if they were working independently.

Active externalism can also be applied to the field of medicine, offering a fascinating perspective on the role of the physician. In medical practice, diagnostic tools like CT scanners and MRI machines serve as a part of a physician’s mind. These tools provide critical information that goes beyond the natural perceptual abilities of humans. They can reveal detailed internal structures of the body that are not visible to the naked eye, aiding in the diagnosis of conditions that would otherwise be inaccessible to a doctor’s cognition. In this way, CT’s and MRI’s serve as an extension of vision, allowing clinicians to “see” outside of the visible color spectrum and into the realms of high-energy x-ray wavelengths and detailed magnetic field variations, respectively. Moreover, these scans allow for a deeper cognitive understanding of the patient’s condition, and physicians can integrate this data with other knowledge to enable more accurate diagnoses and treatments. Essentially, these imaging technologies not only extend the physician’s perceptual capabilities but also augment their cognitive processes.

In the same way that apps on the smartphone extend memory, electronic health records (EHRs) can also extend the memory and capabilities of healthcare professionals. They can provide a comprehensive and accessible repository of patient information including medical history, test results, and treatment information. EHRs allow providers to access vast amounts of data that would be impossible to retain in their internal memory, allowing their internal cognitive load to be focused on integrating the information, rather than memorizing it. The same reasoning can be applied to medical and scientific literature, online databases, and online forums, all of which act as external cognitive resources. These resources greatly extend the physician’s knowledge base beyond what any single individual could hope to memorize or comprehend on their own.

Strengths

Active externalism aligns well with the concept of haptic realism, proposed by Mazviita Chirimuuta. Haptic realism emphasizes the importance of interaction, physical contact, and purposeful exploration of the natural world in the process of perception. Chirimuuta argues that, just as touch requires contact and exploration to understand the external world, scientific thought informs us about the natural world through interactive qualities. She contrasts haptic realism with vision science, arguing that science should not rely on a passive reception of information, but an active, exploratory process that involves interaction with the environment. This idea of haptic realism aligns quite well with active externalism. Just as haptic realism emphasizes interaction and exploration in perception, active externalism emphasizes the use of external devices and technologies in cognition. These two ideas have a shared emphasis on interaction and integration with the external world as essential. Just as haptic realism asserts that touch and physical interaction are crucial for a deeper understanding of the world in science, active externalism suggests that external tools and technologies are not mere adjuncts to cognition but are integral components of it. Both of these perspectives challenge the traditional notion of passive reception in cognition and perception, suggesting a dynamic interplay between the individual and external world. In essence, both haptic realism and active externalism suggest a more expansive definition of cognition and understanding, one that transcends the boundaries of the human body and embraces the transformative potential of our interactions with the external environment.

Active externalism also fits well with Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s Amerindian Perspectivism. De Castro defines “nature” as what differentiates beings, “culture” as the universal aspect of different beings, and “supernatural” as the existence of beings beyond their natural form. Just as active externalism extends cognition beyond the realm of immediate sensory experiences, Amerindian supernaturalism presents a realm of individuality that goes beyond ordinary experiences, encompassing spiritual or mystical aspects of reality. In the context of Amerindian perspectivism, an individual’s internal cognition can be considered akin to “nature” or “culture” (or a blend of both). In this context, the supernatural could be paralleled with the extended cognitive realms that active externalism explores, where cognition is not just a product of the brain’s internal workings but is dynamically shaped by interactions with the external environment. Thus, both active externalism and Amerindian perspectivism challenge traditional views, suggesting an expanded understanding of cognition and perception. This reshapes how we might understand the mind not as an isolated entity, but as something deeply connected with, and responsive to, the broader environment.

The idea of active externalism also pairs nicely with Ellen Clarke’s notion of biological individuality. Clarke argues that traditional views of biological individuality, often based on physical or genetic boundaries, may be inadequate or overly simplistic. She emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive approach to defining individuality, one that accounts for the complex and interconnected nature of life forms. Both Clarke’s notion of biological individuality and the concept of active externalism emphasize the importance of considering broader, interconnected systems, rather than restricting the focus to individual, isolated units. Both concepts highlight the emergent properties and capabilities that arise from interconnectedness, whether in biological networks, like a thriving ecosystem, or in collective minds, like a learning environment.

Weaknesses

While active externalism offers a compelling redefinition of cognition, it does have limitations, especially when considering its practical implications in our present society. Traditional societal views often delineate the mind and environment, which is likely rooted in longstanding tradition that privileges internal, individual cognition over external, distributed processes. Embracing active externalism on a wider level may be difficult due to deeply entrenched beliefs in the sanctity and exclusivity of the human mind. There may be skepticism towards active externalism fueled by a cultural and educational system that emphasizes individual achievement over collaboration. Further, this idea may be unsettling for some as it blurs the lines between self and non-self, but it is important to recognize that this theory does not dismiss the individual, but rather expands on what it is to be an individual.

Overall, I believe that weaknesses attributed to active externalism are not inherent flaws in the theory itself but are reflections of our societal and cultural inclinations towards internalism. To fully appreciate the potential of active externalism, a paradigm shift in our understanding of cognition, which recognizes the integration of the mind, body, and environment in the cognitive process, is required.

References

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7

Clarke, E. (2010). The problem of biological individuality. Biological Theory, 5(4), 312–325. https://doi.org/10.1162/biot_a_00068

Chirimuuta, M. (2016). Vision, perspectivism, and haptic realism. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 746–756. https://doi.org/10.1086/687860

De Castro, E. V. (1998). Cosmological deixis and amerindian perspectivism. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 4(3), 469. https://doi.org/10.2307/3034157